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RECENT CASE NOTES
the statute." Emerson v. Slater, 22 Howard 28; Davis v. Patrick, 141
U. S. 479. It has been stated that under the statute the real question as
to whether the new promisor is liable or not should be the question of
whether the new promise can be said to be one creating an obligation in
him independently of whether the original obligor is still liable, so that
the new promisor comes under an independent duty of payment irre-
spective of the duty of the original obligor; or whether it is a promise to
answer for the debt of another. Whether the consideration comes from
the original obligor to the new promisor should only be evidence, more or
less strong, as to whether a new and independent obligation has been
created. Arnold, Suretyship and Guaranty Sec. 60; 27 C. J. 160. Willis:
The Statute of Frauds: A Legal Anachronism, 3 Indiana L. J. 427.
But it is difficult to reconcile the rationale of this Petty Case with
Harvey v. Lowry, 152 N. E. 839 (1926). There a judgment debtor had
conveyed land subject to the judgment, and a deed to a remote grantee
provided that the grantee assumed and agreed to pay the judgment as
part of the purchase price. The court by implication stated that the act
of acceptance of such deed of assumption was not an agreement on the
part of the grantee to pay the judgment. No case is cited. "The ac-
ceptance of a deed, whether poll or inter parties, containing a covenant
on the part of the grantee is equivalent to an agreement on his part to
perform the same and it is immaterial that the deed is not signed by him."
16 C. J. 1211, citing many an Indiana case. Section 388 of Tiffany on
Real Property is to the same effect, citing Co. Lit, 230 C. Butler's note;
Shepard's Touchstone, 177 and cases. The court stated by dictum: "even
if the grantee by the provision in the deed had agreed to pay the judg-
ment and such agreement had been made for the judgment debtor's bene-
fit, the agreement not being signed by the grantee was within the statute
of frauds prohibiting an action on a promise to answer for the debt of
another, unless the same or some memorandum thereof is in writing and
signed by the party to be charged." The court cites no cases on this point.
The principle in the Lowry case seems not essentially different from
that in the Petty case. Both are instances where heretofore the cases had
seemed uniform that the assumption of the debt was the creation of a new
and independent obligation on the part of the one who assumes by reason
of the fact that he "serves his own interest," thus taking the case out of
the statute. The rule is stated to be that an oral promise by the pur-
chaser of lands subject to a mortgage or other incumbrances to assume
and pay off the incumbrances as part of purchase price is not within the
statute. 27 C. J. 163. Lowe v. Hamilton, 31 N. E. 1117, 132 Ind. 406;
Gregory v. Arms, 48 Ind. App. 562, 96 N E. 196; Lowe v Turpie, 147 Ind.
652, 44 N. E. 25, 36 L. R. A. 233; Berkshire v. Young, 45 Ind, 461; McDill
v. Gunn, 43 Ind. 315; Helm v. Kearns, 40 Ind. 124; Southern Ind. Loan, etc.,
v. Roberts, 42 Ind. App. 653, 86 N. E. 490.
It would seem that on principle the dictum of the Lowry case is un-
sound J. V. H.
WILLS-CLASSES OF LEGAcms--The testator died leaving a will with the
following clause: "I bequeath to my daughter, Mabel L. Waters, Salt Lake
City, Utah, or to her heirs, if she shall die before me, five thousand (5000)
dollars cash out of the Burbank estate, Pittsburgh, Pa." The widow, step-
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son and daughter were made parties to the suit by the plaintiff, as ad-
ministrator, who asks for a judgment of the construction of the will. The
widow contends there is a specific legacy wholly payable from the assets
of the Burbank estate alone and the daughter says she is entitled to the
whole amount as it was a demonstrative legacy. The court found that
there had been instructions given in the execution of the will that the
daughter should receive the sum of $5000 to be paid out of the money
derived from the Burbank estate, and in pursuance to the instruction the
item had been drawn up. The court then found that this was a specific
gift and the daughter was entitled only to the returns of the estate re-
gardless of the amount in deficiency. The daughter appeals and the judg-
ment was affirmed. Waters v. Selleck, Supreme Court of Indiana, Feb. 6,
1930, 170 N. E. 20.
There are three kinds or classes of legacies: specific, general and
demonstrative. The first class is a gift of a definite thing or a particu-
lar portion of the estate, which is described to distinguish it. A general
legacy is one payable from the assets of the whole estate. The third class
is a fusion of the first two whereby the legacy is payable out of the gen-
eral assets in case of failure of the particular fund. Words and Phrases,
p. 1980; In re Wilson, (Pa.) 103 At. 880; Kramer v. Kramer, 201 Fed.
248. The question whether a legacy is in a particular class is primarily
one of the intention of the testator. Thayer v. Paulding, (Mass.) 85 N. E.
868. The particular characteristics are to be attached to each because
they are construed to have been so intended in the first instance. Page
on Wills (2nd Ed.), Sec. 1225.
Courts, in order to protect the legatee, have generally been very liberal
in construing wills; and where there is insufficient language to call a gift
specific, they have called it demonstrative. Ives v. Canby, 48 Fed. 718.
The main reason for being wary of specific gifts is that in case the tes-
tator disposes of the particular thing during his life-time, the gift is con-
sidered to be adeemed. New Albany Trust Co. v. Powell, 29 Ind. App. 494,
64 N. E. 640. If there has been an unquestioned ademption of the legacy
then there is no question of general or specific legacy. The courts have
invoked one rule of construction that has proved helpful in avoiding spe-
cific gifts in favor of demonstrative legacies. There is a presumption that
the testator intended to make a sensible and equitable disposition and if
the relation of the legatee is such that the ademption could not be antici-
pated, then the bequest is general. Johnston v. Conover, (N. J.) 35 At.
291. The weight given to the presumption differs in various jurisdictions
from a very strong one in Pennsylvania to the converse where a slight
indication that the gift is specific will determine the intent in Rhode
Island. Wilson's Estate, (Pa.) 103 Atl. 880; Sherman v. Riley, (R. I.) 100
Atl. 629. The fact that the legatee was the natural bounty of the testator
has been considered in determining the intention. The fact that the legacy
is primary and the fund from which it is payable is secondary leads the
courts in some states to call it demonstrative.
The apparent conflict between the Supreme Court and Appellate Court
upon the intention of the testator and in arriving at a different result in
the same case may be explained upon one basis. (See Waters v. Selleck,
App. Court of Ind., Oct. 11, 1928, 163 N. E. 233; 4 Ind. Law Journal, p.
278.) The Supreme Court sees a clear intention in the finding of fact
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that the testator had given directions to the scrivener to the effect that the
daughter should receive $5,000 in cash "to be paid out of the money de-
rived from the Burbank estate" and that in consequence the item was drawn
up. This finding of fact apparently was not questioned. The direction
to the scrivener unquestionably tends to show an intent on the part of
the testator to make the gift specific, but it was not referred to in the
Appellate Court's decision holding the gift demonstrative. There is au-
thority in point with the Supreme Court on very similar facts but that
is of very little value when the intent of the testator is in question. In
re Tillinghast, (R. I.) 49 Atl. 634; Gelbrach v. Shively, (Md.) 10 Atl.
The Appellate Court, in its decision on the face of the will alone, and
without considering the direction of the testator, seems to have reached
a decision in line with modern trend of cases; whereas, the Supreme Court,
in the light of this finding of fact, was justified in affirming the judgment
of the lower court on the ground that the actual intent of the testator was
revealed. R. R. D.
WILLS-DEvISE OvER ON DECEASE OF FIRST TAKER-CONSTRUCTION-
The will of testatrx provided: "I give, devise and bequeath as follows,
that is to say, I give to my beloved 'Step' daughter Lillie B. Ratcliff of
Owen county, for love and affection, also considering her care and atten-
tion to me in my declining years, also to give George Taylor (colored) for
services rendered as a faithful servant for more than forty years:
"To each of them I give $1,000 out of any money of which I may die
possessed. Also in connection with the foregoing I give to said Lillie Belle
Ratcliff and George Taylor (colored) the following described real estate
provided, however, none of the before described land shall be sold during
the natural life of said George Taylor, but that the said Lillie Bell Rat-
cliff shall provide for the said George Taylor a home during his natural
life and at his death it shall be the property of the aforesaid Lillie B.
Ratcliffe and her heirs forever.
"I direct that the following described lands . . . be sold and that
the proceeds . . . be divided into three equal shares and that one share
be given to my beloved 'Step' daughter Lillie Belle Ratcliff, and that one
share be given to my son-in-law James E. Champer of Greencastle, In-
diana, and one share to George Taylor. Now if the said Lillie Belle Rat-
cliffe shall decease then her heirs shall receive her share, provided they
shall carry into effect the provisions of this will.
"If the said James E. Champer and his wife shall decease, then the
said Lillie Belle Rateliff shall receive his share, or her heirs if she be not
living.
"The purpose of this gift to the said George Taylor (colored) is that
he may be provided with a comfortable home and living during his natural
life but after his death . . . then . . . it shall become the property
of the aforesaid Lillie B. Ratcliff to be hers and her heirs for ever after."
James E. Champer, and his wife (who was his sole heir) died after
testatrix, and the appellant Lillie B. Ratcliff claimed a remainder in the
% share which had been given the Champers, on the ground that (1) con-
sidering the rest of will, testatrix intended a life estate only in James E.
Champers, and (2) that the words "if the said James E. Champer and
